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Abstract 
Under nonhomothetic preferences developing countries are less likely to gain from multilateral 
trade liberalization than developed countries. This paper shows that this relative disadvantage 
for developing countries changes when the effects on public good provision are taken into 
account. The impact it has depends on the strength of their comparative advantage in export 
markets. We show that a strong (weak) comparative advantage in export markets mitigates 
(reinforces) the relative disadvantage of multilateral trade liberalization for developing 
countries. Moreover, in the presence of public goods provision, the relative disadvantage for 
developing countries with a strong comparative advantage is further mitigated when also 
income differences within countries are taken into account. 
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1. Introduction 
When considering the effects of reciprocal trade liberalization it is important to account for 
income differences between and within countries. Stibora & de Vaal (2007) show that 
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developing countries (poorer countries) may witness welfare losses as the real income gains of 
trade liberalization will accrue to countries that produce the more advanced goods (richer 
countries) resulting in a terms of trade deterioration for poorer countries. This novel insight is 
obtained by introducing nonhomothetic preferences in their analysis; an aspect that, despite its 
empirical relevance, has not received much attention in trade-theoretic analyses.1 
We argue that the relative disadvantage of trade liberalization may be less strong for 
developing countries once the effect on public good provision is taken into account. While 
Stibora & de Vaal (2007) acknowledge an impact on tariff revenues, they make the standard 
assumption that tariff revenue is directly redistributed to households. In contrast, taxes typically 
find their way to households through the provision of public goods (e.g. UN Economic and 
Social Council, 2004). This gives rise to an effect on household welfare that is unaccounted for 
in their analysis: cutting import tariffs and other trade taxes will reduce the government budget, 
thereby endangering the provision of public goods. This may be particularly relevant for low- 
and middle income countries, where trade taxes still constitute a relatively important source of 
government revenue. Data taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators show, 
for instance, that the share of taxes on international trade in total revenue in 2008 was on 
average 7.4% for lower middle income countries, compared to 4% for upper middle income 
countries and zero for high income countries.2 Furthermore, the structural characteristics of 
developing countries preclude a smooth transition from trade to domestic taxes (Khattry & Rao, 
2002). 
In contrast to Stibora & de Vaal (2007), this paper explicitly introduces a government that 
uses import tariff revenues to finance public goods. Using their set-up, with nonhomothetic 
preferences, we trace the implications of cutting import tariffs for public good provision and 
determine how this changes the overall welfare assessment of reciprocal trade liberalization. 
We show that particularly households in developing countries with a strong comparative 
advantage in export markets will be less negatively affected when tariff revenues are 
redistributed to households indirectly. Taking into account income differences within countries 
as well further reduces the relative disadvantage of these countries. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the model. Section 3 considers the impact 
of multilateral tariff cuts on public good provision. Section 4 considers welfare effects and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. North-South trade with nonhomothetic preferences3 
For our analysis we extend the Ricardian trade model with nonhomothetic preferences studied 
by Stibora & de Vaal (2007) by introducing a government sector that provides public goods. 
We first present an overview of the model, focussing on relevant and new aspects. We assume 
                                                 
1
 According to Deaton and Muellbauer (1983) most household budget studies support the assumption of 
nonhomotheticity. Hunter and Markusen (1988) and Hunter (1991) report that as much as 29 percent of world 
trade may be caused by nonhomogeneous preferences. 
2
 These data are consistent with the finding by Ebrill et al. (1999) that the share of trade taxes in GDP is inversely 
related to the level of development. For African low-income countries, the share was 5.5% on average in 1995, 
only marginally down from 6.7% in 1975. 
3
 A more detailed account of our modeling set-up can be found in an earlier working paper version, see Stibora & 
de Vaal (2007a). 
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that South is the developing country and North the developed country; we associate the use of 
an asterisk to the North. 
 
Production and trade There exists a competitive goods sector consisting of an unbounded 
continuum of competitive industries, indexed by   0,∞, each producing a homogeneous 
good also indexed by . Let  and 	 be the unit labor requirement for good  in South 
and North. The South has a comparative advantage in lower ranked ; that is 
 	/ is continuous and strictly decreasing in , 
′  0. Define    ̂⁄ 	 ̂⁄   0 as a measure of the strength of South's comparative advantage at  (a hat 
denoting a percentage change). Trade flows are distorted by tariffs, where 	 is one plus the 
uniform ad valorem import tariff imposed by South (North). Northern wages are numéraire, 	  1. To ensure that South is the poorer of the two countries, we assume  that it has an 
absolute disadvantage in all industries, that is, 	   for all . This ensures that in 
equilibrium   1. 
 
Production is determined by producer prices which differ from consumer prices by 
destination-based value-added-taxes,  and 	. The local price  (	) of good  is:  
 
   min, 	     and 	  min		, 		 . (1)  
 
South produces good  if  $ 
 and North produces  if 
 $ 	. The borderline 
commodities between South's (North's) non-traded commodities and North's (South's) exports 
are denoted by ̃  
&'/ and ̃	  
&'	,  where ̃	  ̃. Hence, South produces 
commodities   0, ̃, of which   0, ̃	  are exclusively produced in South and exported. 
North produces goods   ̃	,∞, exporting the higher-indexed goods   ,( ∞. Goods   ̃	, ̃ define an intermediate range of goods that both countries produce and do not trade. 
 
Nonhomothetic demand There are ) )	 southern (northern) households with identical 
tastes. Different effective labor endowments generate an income distribution (Matsuyama, 
2000). Goods come in discrete units and households' demand is satiated after consuming one 
unit, indicated by the consumption indicator *  0,1 . Making appropriate assumptions to 
ensure that the order in which households purchase goods is the same as the order of 
comparative advantage (see Stibora & de Vaal, 2007), households purchase lower-indexed 
goods first and extend consumption to higher-indexed goods only when their income increases, 
leading to higher utility. Hence, South (North) has a comparative advantage in the production 
of lower-ranked (higher-ranked) goods which are consumed by poorer (richer) households. 
 
The utility of households also depends on the availability of a public good + and is defined 
in general form as 
 ,-  ,- .+; 0 *1∞2 3. (2)  
An analogous expression holds for northern households. We assume that marginal utility of 
the public good + is positive but decreasing. 
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Let 4 (4	) denote the skill level of a southern (northern) household. We will consider two 
specific skill distributions. The homogeneous population case (HOM) assumes that all 
households are endowed with one unit of effective labor (4  4	  1) and everyone can afford 
to spend their last unit of income on the higher-indexed goods North produces (see below). The 
heterogeneous population case (HET) assumes that in both countries part of the population has 
a skill level 45 and 45	 , which in equilibrium deprives them of purchasing the higher-indexed 
northern goods. Without loss of generality, we assume that this applies to half of the population 
in each country. The other half of the population has skill level (46 , 46	 ), allowing them to 
spend their last unit of income on northern goods. The main difference between the two skill 
distributions considered is that HET permits income differences within countries. 
 
Define  
 7  0 81892  0 min , 	 18
9
2  (3)  
 
as the minimum income a southern household requires to consume . The highest-indexed 
commodity : a southern household is able to consume is derived from 
 
 
7:  4- , (4)  
with 4-  denoting the relevant skill level (4,  45 or 46). An analogous condition applies to a 
northern household, determining :	 as the highest ranked good it can afford. Note therefore that 
the total number of  industries in our model is endogenously determined by the tariff rates set 
and the income levels of consumers. For HOM it holds that in equilibrium ̃	  ̃  :  :	, 
since northern households are richer than southern households (  1 and 4  4	  1). For 
HET there are )/2 households who do not import in equilibrium (:5  ̃), while in North there 
are )	/2 households who only import :5	  ̃	. 
 
To distinguish the two specific skill distributions, we use the notation >?  0, 1/2 , :?  :, :6  and 4?	  1, 45	 @ 46	  for A  HOM, HET  below. 
 
Government budget The public good is characterized by jointness in consumption and non-
excludability. It is financed by revenues collected from a value added tax  and an import tariff . All taxes are set and collected by the government which also hires labor to produce public 
goods. Requiring balanced government budgets, we get: 
 
 G+  1  >?) H  1 0 	818 @ 4?   1IJ9K L (5)  
  
 G	 +	  1  >?)	 H	  1 .2>?45			 @ 0 8189K
	
2 3 @ 4?	 
	  1	 L, (6)  
 
with G (G	 ) the unit labor requirement. The first and second terms on the right-hand-side of 
these expressions represent revenue from import tariff and value added tax, respectively.  
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In the southern government budget, (5), there are positive import tariff revenues as long as 
there are households that import, that is when :  ̃ (HOM) and :6  ̃ (HET); this is assumed 
to hold in equilibrium. In the northern government budget, (6), import tariff revenues are 
always positive since northern households always import (some of) the lower-indexed goods 
produced by South, M 8189K	2  > 0. Income differences within countries affect total northern 
revenue from import tariffs: in the HOM case all households contribute equally to tariff 
revenue; in the HET case a poor household contributes 	  145	/		 to tariff revenue 
while a rich household's contribution amounts to 	  1 · M 8189K	2 . 
 
Equilibrium properties Trade equilibrium requires equal values of exports and imports. This 
implies, from South's point of view, 
 
 
)			 H >?1  >? 1 45	 @ 		 0 818
9K	
2 L  ) H4?  2>?45   0 818
9K
2 L. (7)  
 
This reveals an important difference in the way the trade balance is affected by southern 
wages  and its dependence on northern policy parameters, depending on the assumed skill 
distributions (HOM, HET). 
 
In the homogeneous population case, >6OP  0 ,  does not appear directly in the trade 
balance condition (7) and it exerts only an indirect impact through its relation to ̃ and ̃	. With 
all households rich enough to afford the higher-ranked northern goods, changes in purchasing 
power only affect consumption of northern goods. With trade initially balanced, no wage 
adjustment is required to restore balanced trade since there is no shift in spending from northern 
goods to southern goods. A similar reasoning explains why in the homogeneous population 
case only southern policy parameters are relevant for trade balance equilibrium. The real 
income gains arising, e.g., from lower southern tariffs, are spent on northern goods. This 
requires South to increase its range of production to preserve trade balance. When northern 
tariffs fall, the gains accrue to northern households. They will expand their consumption basket 
towards the higher-ranked goods produced in North, requiring no trade balance adjustments. 
 
In contrast, in the heterogeneous case, >6QR  1/2 , the trade balance condition will 
depend on southern wages and on northern policy parameters. This is due to the fact that part of 
North's population only buys southern goods.4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The trade balance condition holds if  is sufficiently small in equilibrium. The asymmetry in these trade 
balance effects disappears when tariff revenues are redistributed back to households, see Stibora & de Vaal 
(2007). 
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3. Trade liberalization and public good provision 
We next want to evaluate the effects of multilateral tariff reductions. To this end, we define 1P/P as the proportional change in both the northern and southern tariff rates, i.e. 1/ 1	/	   1P P⁄  0. The impact of multilateral trade liberalization on public goods 
provision in South and North then becomes:5 
 
 G+ +S̂P  1  >?) 0 	818
IJ
9K  (8)  
  
@ 1  >?T?   1))	̃̃ U̃	 .0 818
9K	
2  2>? 0 818
IV	
2 3  2̃	̃	W 
  
 
 G	 +	 +S	̂P  1  >?)	 H	 0 818
9K	
2 @ 2>? 0 818
IV	
2 L (9)  
@ 	  1)	T?
XYY
Z
YY[ 1  >? .)
	̃ 0 8189K	2 @ )̃̃  2>?)	̃ ̃
	̃	̃	 3
\ .̃	 0 8189K	2  2̃	̃	3
@>? ̃	̃	̃	 ̃)	 H̃	 .0 8189K
	
2  0 818
IV	
2 3  2̃	̃	L]Y
Y^
YY_, 
  
 
where T?  0 for A  HOM, HET . Recall,    ̂⁄  	 ̂⁄   0 measures South's 
comparative advantage at . Equations (8) and (9) indicate that the impact on public good 
provision has two effects. The first term in both expressions represents the price effect caused 
by the change in tariff revenue and the second term represents a volume effect. 
The price effect is unambiguously negative in both countries since tariffs go down (̂P  0). 
The magnitude of the price effect depends on the skill distribution case considered with the 
price effect smaller in magnitude in the HET case, >6QR  1 2⁄  , compared to HOM, >6OP 0 . When considering a nondegenerate skill distribution, the price effect is substantially 
stronger in South than in North since in North even poor households import from South, while 
only half of the southern households can afford to import northern goods. As long as the 
income of the poorest southern households is insufficient to afford northern import goods, this 
result generalizes to all conceivable income distributions within countries. 
The volume effect of trade liberalization is ambiguous for both countries and its sign 
depends on the effect on South's range of imported goods,  
  1:?  1̃̂P   0 `  H̃	 .0 818
9K	
2  2>? 0 818
IV	
2 3  2̃	̃	L   0. 
 (10)  
                                                 
5
 The derivations of the comparative statics effects we discuss are available upon request. 
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If South's import range increases (decreases) the volume effect is positive (negative) in the 
HOM case (>6OP  0 ) for both countries. For the HET case (>6QR  1 2⁄  ), an additional 
condition needs to be satisfied which however is also related to the strength of South's 
comparative advantage at ̃	, ̃	. As long as South has a comparative advantage in its 
marginal export good ̃	, South's terms of trade must deteriorate to restore trade balance. When ̃	 is sufficiently large to ensure that the right hand side of equation (10) is positive, the 
deterioration of the terms of trade is so large that southern households reduce the range of 
goods they are able to consume, 1:  0, while increasing the range of goods South produces, 1̃  0. 
For both HOM and HET, it thus follows that the stronger the comparative advantage at ̃	, 
the more likely the volume effect will be negative. The effect is more pronounced for North, 
since the real income effects in both countries primarily affect goods that North exports. If, 
instead, ̃	's value is sufficiently low to ensure that South's import range increases, this will 
be more beneficial for North's public good. 
Overall, the effect of trade liberalization on the provision of public goods is negative for 
both South and North if ̃	 is sufficiently large, ceteris paribus. On account of a less 
negative volume effect, the impact on South is less detrimental though. This advantage is 
amplified by a less negative price effect in case household incomes differ within countries. 
When the strength of South's comparative advantage at ̃	 is smaller, the overall effect on 
public good provision becomes ambiguous. Moreover, the relative advantage of the volume 
effect shifts to North, while HET remains favorable for South. These results emanate from the 
biased spending effect of any real income change on northern goods. Furthermore, if part of 
society does not import, public goods provision will be less affected by a decrease in trade, for 
tariff revenues constitute a smaller part in the overall government budget. 
 
 
4. Welfare effects 
We next consider the welfare effects of multilateral tariff reductions in the presence of public 
goods. The welfare effect of multilateral tariff reductions on the range of goods a southern 
household is able to consume can be expressed by  
 
  	:?1:?̂P  ̃)	 0 	818
IJ
9K  a
̃	 bM 8189K	2  2>? M 818IV	2 c  2̃	̃	T? d, 
 
where :?  : in case of HOM and :?  :6 in case of HET. The sign of the welfare effect for 
rich southern households brought about by the change in the range of competitive goods 
consumption is ambiguous and depends on the sign of (10), which refers to the change in the 
trade volume. Poor southern households are not directly affected by this trade policy since they 
do not exchange goods that are trade internationally, :51:5  0. 
By contrast, rich and poor households in North unambiguously gain from reciprocal tariff 
cuts:  
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	:?	1:?	̂P  	̃	 0 818
9K	
2  a
̃)	 bM 8189K	2 @ 2>? M 818IV	2 c @ 2)̃̃T? d 
 	:5	1:5	̂P  ̃	 0 818
IV	
2  a
̃)	 bM 8189K	2 @ 2>? M 818IV	2 c @ 2)̃̃T? d, 
 
where :?	  :	 for HOM and :?	  :6	  for HET. 
 
These results on competitive goods consumption are qualitatively the same as in Stibora & 
de Vaal (2007). When combined with the welfare effects on account of public goods provision, 
and irrespective of how we weigh the two arguments in the utility function (2), we can conclude 
that when trade decreases (equation (10) greater than zero), the inclusion of public goods 
improves the relative welfare position of southern households upon multilateral trade 
liberalization. The disadvantage of southern households on account of private good 
consumption – southern households lose while northern households gain – is mitigated by the 
more negative effect on public good provision for North. This is even more pronounced in the 
heterogeneous population case. If, on the other hand, trade increases upon liberalization 
(equation (10) smaller than zero), the inclusion of public goods deteriorates the relative welfare 
position of southern households. Although southern households also gain from competitive 
goods consumption, now their relative disadvantage in comparison to northern households is 
amplified by the effect on public goods provision. 
These results arise because redistributing tariff revenue through public good provision 
moderates the effects of trade liberalization differently than rebating tariff revenues directly to 
households. The latter case implies that households effectively pay tariff exclusive prices, so 
that the rebates can be seen as a lump-sum subsidy to households that import. This is not the 
case when tariff revenue is redistributed through financing public goods, implying a 'subsidy' to 
all households paid by households who import. This primarily matters when not all households 
within a country have the same income level. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In general, multilateral tariff reductions are considered to be beneficial for all parties involved 
as it enhances economic efficiency. This perception is not validated when preferences are 
nonhomothetic, in which case reciprocal trade liberalizations are likely to deteriorate the terms 
of trade for developing countries (Stibora & de Vaal, 2007). This paper shows that the relative 
disadvantage for developing countries changes when the effects on public good provision are 
also taken into account. The crucial aspect is whether or not trade increases when tariff rates are 
cut multilaterally. If developing countries have a strong (weak) comparative advantage in 
export markets, trade will decrease (increase) and the relative disadvantage of multilateral trade 
liberalization for developing countries is mitigated (reinforced) by the inclusion of public good 
provision. We also show that the income distribution within countries matters, as it reduces the 
relative disadvantage of developing countries with a strong comparative advantage even further.  
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These results have been obtained in a framework that has made the same assumptions 
regarding technology and preferences as in Stibora & de Vaal (2007). This has served the 
purpose well of determining how it matters when the budgetary consequences of import tariffs 
cuts affect households through the provision of public goods rather than through direct 
redistribution schemes. Clearly, to obtain a more complete picture of how trade liberalization 
affects public goods provision and welfare when preferences are nonhomothetic requires close 
scrutiny of some of the assumptions made. For instance, the analysis takes an extreme view on 
preferences for competitive goods by excluding substitution effects altogether. Other forms of 
nonhomothetic preferences, for example as proposed by Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), could be 
considered to see how robust our results are. Furthermore, we have not made explicit how 
public goods and competitive goods consumption exactly combine to generate household 
utility. Though, as argued, this is immaterial for the comparison with Stibora and de Vaal 
(2007), it would affect the overall welfare assessment. 
The analysis we offer could also be extended. One extension would be to allow government 
to take measures to compensate the lost revenue from import taxation. Clearly, this will give 
rise to a trade-off in terms of welfare: budget-neutralizing schemes are good for welfare 
because of their effect on public goods provision, while a negative welfare effect arises because 
higher taxes imply lower real income. In contrast to standard analyses assuming homothetic 
preferences, we would expect that especially the poor in developing countries will be negatively 
affected by (the introduction of) such schemes. Consuming a much lower share of their income 
on imported goods than rich people, lower income groups hardly benefit from income tariff cuts 
yet fully share the burden of increased domestic taxation. From this perspective, it would also 
be interesting to find out how these effects will depend on the particular type of tax instrument 
being used (for instance, value-added-taxes versus direct income taxation) and on the particular 
way such instruments would be implemented (for instance, linear versus progressive taxation). 
Our framework could also be used to analyse how nonhomothetic preferences would matter 
for the outcomes of the extensive literature discussing the (welfare) effects of piecemeal tariff 
reforms, see Anderson and Neary (2007) for a survey. The contributions in this literature appear 
to focus exclusively on the efficiency effects of tariff changes: tariff cuts are offset by increases 
in consumption taxes to secure the efficiency gains from trade liberalization while preserving 
public revenue for a small open economy. Our paper could add to this literature by offering a 
framework that also allows for a focus on distributional issues. Furthermore, by including 
nonhomothetic preferences, we employ a framework that assigns a central role to income 
differences between and within countries, an issue that is not addressed in this particular 
literature at all, despite its focus on developing countries. 
Finally, the theory could be linked with the empirical literature, which would however 
require more than two countries to be considered. Until recently, the main obstacle to this 
extension has been the lack to rank goods across countries according to comparative advantage. 
As shown by Costinot (2009), this can be solved by the powerful concept of log-
supermodularity and we leave this extension for future  research. 
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